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Chapter 1

Unfinished Business
Postmodern Feminism
in Personality Psychology
JEANNE MARECEK

Psychologists have set about describing the true nature of
women with a certainty and a sense of their own infallibility ·
rarely found in the secular world.... Psychology has nothing
to say about what women really are like, what they need, and
what they want, essentially because psychology does not
know:
-Weisstein (1971, pp. ~.o7, 209)

Theories of feminine personality were easy targets for the ire of secondwave feminists inside and outside psychology. Indeed, the history of psychology amply justifies Weissteins scorn. As the first wave of feminism was
cresting, Grant Allen declared women to be "the sex sacrificed to reproductive necessities," the "passive transmitters" of the gains in human civilization pr~duced by men (1889, p. 258). He summed up the distinction between the sexes succinctly: "All that is distinctly human is man ... ; all that
is truly woman ... is merely reproductive" (p. 263).
Writing at the height of the campaign for women's suffrage, Joseph
Jastrow (1915) devoted a lengthy section to male-female differences in his
personality textbook Character and Temperament. In Jastrow's account,
woman was little more than a uterus surrounded by a supporting personality. He was persuaded that the "divergent anatomy and physiology of sex"
3
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gave rise to a host of male-female dichotomies, including male reason and
female emotion.
In contrast to claims about female personality grounded in reproductive biology, psychoanalysis offered theories based on girls' early experience. At least in theory, psychoanalysis offered possibilities for multiple developmental pathways, diverse feminine personalities, and female sexual
subjectivity. But this multiplicity did not s~rvive in the reworking of psychoanalysis in the postwar United States. Representations of feminine personality in American popular culture during the 1950s enshrined such
psychoanalytic concepts as penis envy, the weeping womb, and female masochism. Writers took as inevitable the inferiority of women's character,
moral fiber, and mental stability. Popular accounts of feminine personality
were prescriptive as well, insisting that for women, heterosexuality, monogamy, marriage, and motherhood were essential conditions for normality,
maturity, and fulfillment. A runaway best-seller of the era was Modern
Woman: The Ldst Sex by Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia Farnham (194 7).
The authors claimed that wartime participation in paid work had "masculinized" women, reducing them to a "bundle of anxieties" and generating
an epidemic of neurosis, delinquency, and disordered emotions throughout
society.
Sexist claims about female psychology did not go unchallenged. In the
early 20th century, feminist psychologists such as Helen Thompson Woolley and Leta Stetter Hollingworth spoke out forcefully against what they
regarded as bogus accounts of female psychology. Woolley, for example,
assailed psychologists for "flagrant personal bias, logic martyred in the
cause of supporting a prejudice, unfounded assertions, and even sentimental rot and drivel" (1910, p. 340). Hollingworth argued against the Darwinian claim that women's genetic makeup made them less likely than men to
be highly,. creative or intelligent. A pacifist, she also spoke out against the
nationalistic pronatalism of World War I propaganda. Later on, psychoanalytic theories also drew sharp criticism. Karen Horney and Clara Thompson, both revisionist psychoanalysts, argued that it was cultural pressures
on women that lay behind the feminine personality patterns that their colleagues had attributed to the intrapsychic residue of early childhood. These
pressures included social and economic dependence on men, the suppression of women's ambition, puritanical restrictions on female sexuality, and
limited opportunities for self-expression and development (Homey, 1926/
1967; Thompson, 1942). Horney (1926/1967) courageously took issue
with the notion of penis envy, pointing out that the· ideas on the subject put
forth by male analysts resembled the "naive assumptions" of small boys. In
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doing so, she challenged Freud as well as Karl Abraham, her own analyst
and teacher. Horney paid a high price for her audacity: she was ostracized
from the psychoanalytic communities in Berlin and in the United States
(Garrison, 1981).
The stirrings of second-wave feminism prompted Daedalus to devote
an issue to the subject "The Woman in America" in the spring of 1964. Erik
Erikson's (1964) infamous paper "Inner and Outer Space: Reflections on
Womanhood" was the lead article. Erikson saw himself as a champion of
women. In his eyes, his was a positive view of female difference and an antidote to both the negative Freudian view and the wrongheaded claims
emerging from the nascent women's movement. For Erikson, women's "inner space"-the "somatic design" that destined them to bear offspringcreated a "biological, psychological and ethical commitment" to care for
human life (1964, p. 586). This inner space was the key to women's identity
and psychological development, as well as to their happiness. Charging that
contemporary feminists were "moralistic," "volatile," and "sharp," Erikson
dismissed calls for, equality of the sexes. In his opinion, the clamor to expand women's presence in public life was a response to deep-seated anxieties about nuclear annihilation. Such a feminine presence could bring to
public life ethical restraint, a commitment to peace, devotion to healing,
and the nurturing values associated with home and family. 1
Second-wave feminists took issue with all these characterizations of
women's psychology. By the mid-1970s, several volumes of collected papers
challenged psychoanalytic claims about personality, psychopathology, and
psychotherapy (Franks &: Burtle, 1974; Miller, 1973; Strouse, 1974). This
critical work gained momentum from the broad-based political movement
behind it. Moreover, a cohort of feminist academics and practitioners stood
ready to build upon it. At least to some extent, the organized presence of
feminists staved off the professional isolation and ostracism that earlier
feminists had endured. Indeed, these second-wave feminists took on the
task of reforming the practice of psychotherapy and counseling more generally. They formulated sets of guidelines for curbing sexism in clinical
practice that were promulgated'by the American Psychological Association
and by the Division of Counseling Psychology.
Feminist scholars of the 1970s also made signal conceptual and methodological advances. Anne Constantinople (1973), for example, pointed
out that standard psychological tests had been constructed with masculinity and femininity as a single, bipolar continuum, making them mutually
exclusive. Test takers were therefore forced to disavow masculinity in order
to be categorized as feminine and vice versa. Building on Constantinople's
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critique, Sandra Bern (1974) devised a measure of masculinity and femininity (the Bern Sex Role Inventory) that permitted respondents to endorse
mixtures of masculine and feminine attributes. Feminist researchers endeavored to reform knowledge-producing practices in psychology more
generally. They drew UP, numerous guidelines for eliminating sexist biases
in the design, execution, and interpretation of studies of male-female differences, as well as guidelines for eliminating sexist language.
The publication of Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Reappraisals (Brown & Ballou, 1992) carried the feminist critical project further,
with its contributors strutinizing a variety of ~heoretical approaches to personality and psychopathology. The papers collected in that volume made it
clear that psychoanalysis was not unique in incorporatihg biases against
women. (Nor indeed were psychoanalytic theories always and necessarily
incompatible with feminism.) Moreover, by 1992, diverging points of view
had emerged within feminist scholarship. Various theories of feminine personality had both their champions and their opponents, as did various approaches to therapy, various methods of producing knowledge, and varying
ideologies of feminism. Feminist personality theory had become-and remains-an arena for vibrant, sometimes fierce, critical interchange and rigorous debate.

POSTMODERNISM AND FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGY
In this chapter, I describe developments in postmodern psychology and
critical psychology. These movements offer feminists additional critical
tools to rethink gender, personality, and psychopathology. Postmodernists
are skeptical of received truths and taken-for-granted frames of reference.
In the postmodern view, knowledge is never innocent, but always valueladen and predicated on specific sociopolitical conditions that it serves to
legitimize. Postmodern inquiry points up the power of discourseutterances, interactions,,and practices-to produce consensual reality and
a shared arena of public conduct. Discourse both regulates and constitutes
consciousness. It constitutes what we know to be the body, conscious and
unconscious mind, and emotional life (Weedon, 1987). The dynamics of
power in everyday social life are another site of postmodern inquiry. This
power "from the bottom" is ubiquitous and far-reaching. Indeed, what
Foucault referred to as "Power/Knowledge" complicates our ideas of freedom. Whether or not we are subject to relations' of force ("power from
above"), we are implicated in the webs of power circulating through lan-
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guage. The critical psychology movement turns its eye on psychology as a
cultural institution, studying how cultural knowledge flows into psychology and how psychological knowledge circulates back through culture,
shoring up the status quo and legitimating prevailing power structures
(Fox &: Prilleltensky, 1997).
For many feminists, postmodernism and critical psychology have been
important allies. They have provided valuable resources for continuing the
tradition of critique that originated with first-wave feminists like Helen
Thompson Woolley. But by and large, in the United States, feminist psychologists have been wary of (and often hostile to) these movements, hurling brickbats like "jargon mongers," "number-phobics," and "antiscience
types." The Psychology of Women Quarterly (PWQ), our flagship journal,
has maintained an offtcial stance that is resolutely opposed to postmodernism. In 1995, the incoming editor set the journal's policy on an exclusionary course: "As a scientific journal, PWQ provides a voice for a side of
feminist psychology that we want to preserve in this age of P?Stmodernism.... PWQ is a research journal with an empirical, scientific tradition
that is centered in the discipline of psychology" (Russo, 1995, pp. 1, 2).
In 2000, the policy statement of the new editor, entitled "PWQ: Feminist Empiricism for the New Millennium," renewed and hardened this
stance: "Nancy Russo argued rightly that PWQ is the scientific voice in
feminist psychology. As feminists, the•new Editorial Board remains committed to the idea that 'PWQ is a research journal with an empirical, scientific tradition that is centered in the discipline of psychology' " (White,
2000, p. 1).
How odd that a journal's editors would proudly announce their aim of
keeping out innovation! How odd-that preserving a single mode of producing knowledge for a full decade would be elevated to a fe:i,ninist ideal. The
later editorial policy goes on to invite "diversity" in journal submissions,
but the examples of diversity it gives are quite staid: "articles with male participants, articles using older data bases, and articles using qualitative
methods" (White, 2000, p. 1).
The description of PWQ as a journal of "feminist empiricism" suggests
that its resistance to postmodern psychology stems not only from resistance
to innovation, but also from an unexamined residue of a timeworn tradition in psychology. Empiricism is the epistemological stance that all knowledge originates in experience and observation, without the aid of theory or
received knowledge. 2 From early on, American psychology was dominated
by an empiricist bias toward data gathering to the exclusion of introspection, theory, and reflection. James McKeen Cattell, who championed
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experimentalism, connected the production of "hard" data in the laboratory
to the ideals of masculine "hardness," muscularity, vigor, and physical exertion embodied in the "New Man" movement; in contrast, he viewed reflection, contemplation, and theory building as passive and therefore associated with femininity and even effeminacy. It is ironic to find Cattell's sexist
dichotomy unwittingly echoed by prominent feminist psychologists (e.g.,
Hyde, 1995; Weisstein, 1993). The latter, for example, has dismissed postmodernism as a "swamp of self-referential passivity" and a "cult of high retreat" (Weisstein, 1993, p. 244).
In short, postmodern ideas have had only limited circulation in U.S.
feminist psychology, even while they have flowered in women's studies, in
other social sciences, and in feminist psychology in other national contexts.
Moreover, these ideas have often been seen through the distorting lens of
positivism. The editors of this volume, Mary Ballou and Laura Brown,
asked me to discuss "postpostmodemism," tjiat is, the directions that feminist psychology might take after postmodernity. In pondering their charge,
I came to believe that we in this country have only scratched the surface of
what feminist postmodernism can offer to the study of personality and psychopathology. Much of this chapter, therefore, takes up the unfinished business of postmodern personality theory.

FEMINISM, POSTMODERNISM, AND
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY: UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Postmodern psychology has encompassed a broad array of initiatives and
ideas. I describe those that seem especially fruitful for feminists working in
personality psychology and psychopathology.

Interrogating Psychology's Constructs
Evelyn Fox Keller (1995) has described gender as "a silent organizer of discursive maps of the social and natural world ... even of those worlds
women never enter." We can pose two questions about how gender silently
organizes the discursive map of psychology:
• How does gender, in concert with other categories of social hierarchy, organize the discourse of psychology?
• How do the resulting psychological constructs serve to distribute
power and resources unequally across the social landscape?
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Feminists have shown that many personality constructs have been
conceptualized in gender-biased ways. They include attachment, passivity,
aggression, field dependence, codependency, attractiveness, emotion, selfesteem, autonomy, and humor. Stephanie Shields (1995, 2002) poses some
questions that a postmodern exploration of emotion might address: How
and when is emotion explicitly labeled in everyday situations? What does it
mean to say that someone "got emotional"? What counts and does not
count as "an emotion" in psychological theory? What kinds of emotional
displays are associated with low-status groups (e.g., women, men of color,
and gay men)? How do these-displays impact on perceived authority, credibility, and power?
Recently feminists and other cultural critics have used the tools of
postmodern analysis to reconsider the constructs of trauma, stress, and
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These constructs have been important in feminists' struggle for public recognition of the seriousness of gender-linked violence, as well as in practitioners' efforts to develop therapeutic approaches for victims. Critiques of constructs that so~e trauma
theorists have put forward are not meant to deny the suffering connected to
traumatic events or to impugn the goodwill.or good intentions of theorists
or therapists. Indeed, the concern of the critics is that the conceptual apparatus of trauma theory has come to have unforeseen negative consequences
for sufferers. When gender-linked violence is inserted into the medicalized
framework of psychiatric diagnosis, the sociopolitical nature of the violence
is expunged (Kleinman, 1995). Moreover, if diverse instances of violence,
atrocity, betrayal, and sexual invasion are simply lumped together as "trauma," their psychic meanings, their interpersonal significance, and possibly
even their moral import are lost to view. Little effort is made to understand
how the lifeworlds and identities of the sufferer and those around her have
been altered. Instead, the focus comes to rest on routine procedures of
symptom removal. That eye movement desensitization and reprocessing
(EMDR) could be proposed as a treatment both for the survivors of the
World Trade Center attack and for a young girl repeatedly molested by her
father seems less a testimony to the efficacy of EMDR than a reminder of
the narrowed outlook of the medicalized perspective.
Other prominent meanings associated with psychological trauma concern the status of victims. One meaning is that victims inevitably and uniformly suffer lasting, even permanent, psychological damage, a meaning
that is double-edged (Haaken, 1998; Lamb, 1999). Also, as Dana Becker
(2000) has persuasively argued, the category PTSD has become part of a
"caste system of diagnosis and treatment": women with PTSD are "good
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girls" and women with borderline personality disorder are "bad girls."
Many feminist therapists have favored the diagnosis of PTSD because, in
their view, it announces to a woman that "she is normal," that is, she is having a "normal" response to an abnormal situation (Marecek, 1999a). However, PTSD, as part of a medicalized and technocratic diagnostic system,
represents a further embrace of the medicalization of women's problems,
not an escape from it.
I briefly mention two additional constructs that have received recent
attention in the psychological literature. One is forgiveness, a construct
promoted heavily by the so-called positive psychology movement. From a
feminist perspective, we can raise many important questions about the
meaningfulness and ethics of conceptualizing forgiveness as a state to be inculcated by cognitive-behavioral techniques: Can we theorize forgiveness
apart from specific contexts of harm? Is forgiveness always a moral good?
Does it always promote the psychological well-being of the forgiver, as its
proponents claim? Embedding forgiveness in its relational context raises
further questions: What harm is to be forgiven? What is the relationship between the injured party and the harm-doer? What was the intent of doing
harm? Should the harm-doer be asked to acknowledge responsibility; show
remorse, and make restitution as a condition for being forgiven? We must
also question why there has been a rush to devise therapies that will inculcate forgiveness, but no companion efforts to devise therapies that inculcate
remorse. To make forgiveness a moral imperative while disregarding the
moral status of the harm-doer is one-sided at best and ethically repugnant
at worst.
Forgiveness is overtly a gender-neutral construct. Yet it is hard to ignore the fact that forgiveness emerged as a research topic promoted by the
positive psychology movement and as a therapeutic goal in a time of intense public and professional discussion of the sexual abuse of children and
intimate violence against women. As a construct abstracted from ongoing
experience, forgiveness appears neutral. This masks the relations of power
involved in gender-linked violations, forgiving, remorse, and restitution.
Moreover, laboratory studies of forgiveness in which one stranger inflicts
trivial harm (e.g., the loss of 25 cents) on another are unlikely to contribute
meaningful knowledge about social relations. In fact, by further shunting
aside the complex power dynamics of real life, such studies can only obfuscate our understanding.
Resilience, another emerging construct in mainstream psychology, has
been extolled by some feminist psychologists. They see it as celebrating
women's efforts to cope and prevail despite hardship, discrimination, and
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life crises. But resilience has another side. As McKinley (2001) has noted,
resilience too often refers to "a woman's ability to adapt to risk in a manner
that is consistent with life trajectories valued by the middle and upper middle class" (p. 85). Moreover, the search'to identify women and girls who are
"resilient" can be a quest for heroines who overcome adversity by personal
effort or inner strength. In this way, the quest to identify the qualities of resilient women seems parallel to the search for the personal and familial
characteristics of "notable" women and "successful" women that occupied
feminist psychology in the early 1970s. (See, e.g., the inaugural issue of
Psychology of Women Quarterly [1976] for several examples of this quest.)
The "Resilient Woman" (or "Girl") can easily be the,other side of the coin
of what Mary Crawford and I called the "Woman-As-Problem" (Crawford
&: Marecek, 1989). Like the Woman-As-Problem, the Resilient Woman stifles social critique; her image replaces a focus on social and economic injustices with a focus on individual triumph through personal will. Moreover, when resilience is construed as a product of personal effort, it suggests
that those who do not thrive are responsible for their plight. The slide from
there to victim blaming seems nearly inevitable.

Historicizing the Psychology of Personality
Like volcanic eruptions, debates about the true differences (and similarities) between women and men have boiled up at intervals since the beginning of U.S. psychology. As early as 1910, Helen Thompson Woolley
warned that the observational design of sex-difference studies made it impossible to draw firm conclusions about the origins of such differences. She
noted that it was impossible to draw comparable samples of men and
women because the social circumstances of their lives were so different.
Similar caveats about sex-difference research have been, reiterated repeatedly over the subsequent 90-odd years. More recently, research on malefemale difference has also been criticized for its essentialism and false universalism (Hare-Mustin &: Marecek, 1994). That is, studies assume that
there are inherent (essential) qualities of womanhood; furthermore, they
make spurious generalizations about all women based on observations of a
limited subgroup of women (usually those who are white, middle class, and
living in industrialized Western countries). Yet despite these fundamental
critiques, studies of male-female differences-by feminists, antifeminists,
and others-continue to be churned out. By 2000, at least 18,700 such
studies had been published in English-language psychology journals.
, A postmodern feminist might approach the literature on male-female
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differences not as a scientific record, but as a historical archive of cultural
trends in the discipline and in the larger society (Marecek, 1995). What is
revealed about cultural change and continuity when we observe the trends
in the record? What are the shifting ideological purposes that have driven
the research? Over the past 30 years, the focus of psychologists' attention
has shifted from sex differences in cognitive abilities to sex differences in
emotional capacities to sex differences in mating and reproductive strategies. Research in the 1970s focused on reevaluating claims of male-female
difference and associated notions of women's inferior intellectual abilities.
In the 1980s, the ground shifted to assessments of male-female differences
in morality, empathy, and care of others, with women touted as superior to
men. This emphasis on difference took a different and less celebratory tum
in mass-market psychology, where celebrity gender experts like Deborah
Tannen, John Gray, and Michael Gurian argued that the sexes were so different that failures of communication, mismatched motives, and incommensurable interests were inevitable. In the 1990s, it was evolutionary
psychologists who grabbed the microphone (or perhaps we should say
megaphone). They too claimed universal and profound differences, differences that served to legitimate and naturalize male privilege, male sexual
dominance, and even violent predation of women by men. Close analysis of
these shifts could tell us a great deal about the changing preoccupations,
anxieties, and vested interests of researchers and funders, as well as the culture at large.
Psychologists often presume that the objects of psychological knowledge are fixed and stable, like those of physics and chemistry. But there are
no brute data of the social world comparable to those of the natural world.
Instead, the terms by which we understand our social relations and ourselves fluctuate as the social world changes. The meanings of psychological
constructs-for example, self-esteem, depression, assertiveness, masculinity, femininity, and premenstrual distress-are local, time-bound, and
matters of social negotiation. Consider, for example, the cop.struct of assertiveness. Popularized by behavior therapists in the 1960s, assertiveness was
at that time contrasted with passivity and self-effacement. By the mid~
1970s, however, lack of assertiveness had become identified as a "woman'.s
problem," with an assortment of psychotherapies, training workshops, professional development seminars, and self-help books to help women become assertive. As a woman's problem, assertiveness gained an additional
layer of meaning. Leaming to be assertive was prescribed as an antidote not
just for passivity but also for aggression. Indeed, a_ best-selling self-help
book of the time was called How to Be an Assertive (Not Aggressive) Woman
(Baer, 1976).
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Another example is premenstrual difficulties. Premenstrual difficulties
were earlier called premenstrual tension (PMT). PMT was said to involve
feeling nervous or "keyed up." When premenstrual distress reemerged as
premenstrual syndrome (PMS) during the 1980s, the central psychological
feature shifted from tension to irritability, "bitchiness," or rage. Moreover,
its name change (from "tension" to "syndrome") elevated its severity'and
presaged its eventual certification as a psychiatric condition. As psychological constructs, assertiveness and PMS have several things in common. Both
shifted in meaning as the second wave of feminism took hold. Both were
widely discussed in self-help culture. Both identified women's' anger as a
psychological problem in need of remedy. This latter view was in sharp contrast to the views of feminists of the 1970s, for whom anger could be invigorating, righteous, and even therapeutic. Seventies feminists (including
some feminist therapists) hoped to instigate women's anger, not to quell it.
They saw anger as a spur to take action and to struggle against unfair conditions. 3 Seen against this background, both PMS and assertiveness seem
like early portents of the backlash against feminism that was to mount over
the next decade.
For a postmodern psychologist, examining the history of constructs
serves as a reminder of their indeterminacy. Our constructs are not faithful
representations of a reality "out there"; instead, their meanings shift in accord with meaning shifts in the surrounding culture. Negotiation over the
status of certain scientific constructs can be contentious. Parlee (1994), for
example, documents the struggle among feminist social scientists, gynecologists, and psychiatrists for control over the meanings of premenstrual distress. Scott (1990) describes a different political struggle-this one involving Vietnam veterans-over the definition and medicalization of PTSD.

Rethinking Sex and Gender
By and large, feminist psychologists have challenged biological explanations for gender difference. Nonetheless, U.S. feminist psychology retains
strong undercurrents of biological foundationalism, as does U.5. psychology and culture. Consider the syllogism that sex is to gender as nature is to
nurture. That is, sex pertains to what is biological or "natural," gender to
what is learned or cultural. Rhoda Unger (1979) put forward this formulation in the American Psychologist over 20 years ago. She defined gender as
"those characteristics and traits socio-culturally considered appropriate to
males and females." Her formulation was intended to set apart social aspects of maleness and femaleness from biological mechanisms, so the former could be submitted to scientific scrutiny. The sex/gender dichotomy
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was a significant conceptual advance in its time, but a reformulation of
both "sex" and "gender" fa her model is now long overdue.
Unger's conceptualization of gender advanced an individual difference
model. Feminist theorists have since articulated other meanings of gender.
Some view gender as a socially prescribed set of relations. Some see gender
as a complex set of principles-a meaning system-that organizes malefemale relations in a particular social group or culture (Hare-Mustin &:
Marecek, 1990). Some see gender as social processes by which status, hierarchy, and social power are distributed. Some conceive gender in terms of
social practices that produce masculinity and femininity in mundane interactions and in social institutions (Bohan, 1993; West &: Zimmerman,
1987). T4ese meanings focus on processes and practices, not static traits,
on relations and social transactions, not private minds. By and large, U.S.
feminist psychologists have yet to make full use of these alternative meanings of gender. Most remain mired in Unger's view of gender as individual
difference and as little more than the cultural elaboration of sex. With such
a view, not only is our sense of gendered possibilities limited, we cannot
readily theorize the emergent gender categories put forward by transgendered, transsexual, intersexed individuals (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Parlee,
1998). Nor can we make use of the provocative theoretical resources put
forward by queer theorists.
The conception of biological sex in Unger's sex/gender dichotomy is
also outdated. In that dichotomy, sex stands as some immutable bedrock
that remains after gender is stripped away. But a large and fascinating body
of work in critical science studies, social history, cultural studies, anthropology, and feminist critical psychology points out that sex, biology, and
"the" body are not pretheoretical, ahistorical, and prediscursive "givens"
(e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Laqueur, 1990). What any cultural group takes
to be "natural" does not exist outside the realm of interpretation and language. Biological "facts" are lodged within webs of assumptions that shift
from one cultural setting to another and from one epoch to another within
the same culture. Feminist psychologists who have shaken loose from biological foundationalism have been able to pursue a variety of questions
about embodied practices. An early example is Suzanne Kessler and Wendy
McKenna's Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach (1978). More recent
examples are the collection edited by Kathy Davis (1997) and Kessler's
(1998) study of intersexed children. Leonore Tiefer (1995, 2001) has
mounted powerful and persuasive critiques of the discourse of sexology, including the human sexual response cycle, conceptions of sexual dysfunction, Viagra culture, and, more recently, the emerging diagnostic category
female sexual dysfunction.
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Cultural Determinism, the Person, and Psychic Life
Feminist psychologists have compiled an impressive corpus of empirical
knowledge about how social contexts structure women's lives and gender
relations. Slowly but surely, that corpus of information is coming to encompass women and girls from diverse backgrounds and social locations. But
the emphasis on the power of the social context to shape women's lives often slides into cultural determinism. In describing the results of empirical
studies, we slide too easily from statistical generalizations (typically showing modest effects and considerable variability) to overgeneralizations to
universal claims. Such universal claims imply that extrapersonal forces
fully determine human action; the person is robbed of any agency whatsoever. A streak of cultural determinism also runs through postmodern psychology. Feminists in psychology who "took the discursive turn" emphasized the power of language to structure subjective experience. In our
analyses of the linguistic categories and dominant discourses authorized by
the culture, those categories often were granted a determining influence
over psychic life. In short, the slide into cultural determinism has been an
easy one for psychologists, no matter where they start.
Why should we bemoa,_n the disappearance of agency from theories in
feminist psychology? What do we gain from formulating theories of personality and adult development that go beyond figuring people as automatons responding to social conditioning or hapless victims of gender (as
phrases like "gender effects" imply)? There are many answers to this question. Most of us have a philosophical commitment to view women as
agents. If our theories and research methods do not make space for psychic
life, intention, and subjectivity, we cannot examine resistance and agency.
We need such theoretical space to study how some people rebel, chafe at restrictions, and produce change. As feminists, many of us are "socialization
failures," as Nancy Datan (1989) put it: we were not automatons who absorbed the cultural dictates of our time. We have made different political
investments than the norm, we interpret the world in a skewed way, we
may have chosen to live nonnormative or unconventional lives, and we engage in oppositional politics, speaking unpopular truths as to power. As
Datan asserted, our theories should enable us to examine and explain our
own lives.
The challenge is to devise what Nancy Chodorow (1999) has called
"both-and" theories. Such theories see people as both constrained by their
circumstances and "doers," as both socially constituted and causal agents.
Such theories must offer an account of how people invest in certain identities and projects, while resisting or rejecting other ones. Such investments
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are both rational and emotional, both conscious and not conscious. People
sometimes espouse identities and pursue courses of action that go against
their self-interest or their conscious desires. Thus far, efforts by psychologists to theorize agency and resistance have drawn upon versions of
psychoanalytic theory (see, e.g., Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, &
Walkerdine, 1984/1998) or on the work of the Soviet theorists Vygotsky
and Bakhtin (1935/1981). Contemporary cultural anthropologists such as
Catherine Lutz, Sherry Ortner, and Dorothy Holland-all of whom have
interests in gender-have developed a particular rich set of resources for
theorizing selves, identities, feelings, agency, and resistance (cf. Holland,
Lachicotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998).

Psychology of Women and History
Concern with real-life contexts sets feminist work apart from much of
mainstream psychology. In the mainstream, social context is seen as a
source of nuisance variance to be eliminated by laboratory controls; college
students (presumed to be stand-ins for generic human beings) are often the
population under study. In contrast, the corpus of research in feminist psychology encompasses a range of respondents and acknowledges their particularity. Feminist psychology has focused on social contexts as sites of injustice and domination: school classrooms, peer groups, marriages and
romantic partnerships, dating relationships, and therapy relationships. By
and large, however, our concern for context has been confined to such
microsocial contexts. It is time for us to turn our gaze farther outward, to
interrogate the larger frameworks of history, society, and culture in which
personal relations are nested.
Some feminist psychologists have shown us the way toward linking
women's lives to larger political, social, and economic structures. Abigail
Stewart and her students and colleagues, for example, have addressed the
impact of historical events on the identities and life trajectories of women
involved in them. These events include the feminist movement, the civil
rights movement, and World War II (see, e.g., Franz & Stewart, 1994, and
Romero & Stewart, 1999). Brinton Lykes and her colleagues (e.g., Lykes,
Brabeck, Ferns, & RadaD:., 1993) have worked with Guatemalan women living under conditions of civil upheaval, state-sponsored terrorism, and guerilla warfare. Walkerdine, Lucey, and Melody (2001) have noted the demand for cheap, mobile female labor created by global capitalism: factory
workers, domestic service workers, sex workers, childcare workers. Walkerdine and colleagues' work takes up the ways that schools and other social
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settings prepare poor and working-class British girls (especially girls of
color) to become part of this labor pool.

MORE UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
CHALLENGING METHODOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES
Michelle flne has urged feminist psychologists to set aside laboratory studies, surveys, and interviews. She implores: "Watch me with women friends,
my son, his father, my niece, or my mother, and you will see what feels
most authentic to me. These very moments, which construct who I am
when I am most me, remain remote from psychological studies of individuals or even groups" (Fine & Gordon, 1993, p. 16).
Many feminist psychologists have made a commitment to research that
addresses women's lived experience. But, as Michelle Fine says, the methodological norms of the discipline keep us from doing so. One such norm is
the preference for standardized instruments. This preference rests on the
assumption that there exist universal, fixed attributes that can be assessed
in a uniform way across locales and social groups. The apparent ease of using "canned" instruments holds great appeal, especially when the professional milieu demands high-speed productivity. But such instruments can
lead to suppression of local variations and "what feels most authentic"
when their meanings do not square with those of respondents. Drawing on
his own research in Puerto Rico, Lloyd Rogler (1999) described how items
on a standardized scale for measuring stress made no sense in the respondents' life situations. A study by Hope Landrine and her colleagues
(Landrine, Klonoff, & Brown-Collins, 1992) offers a powerful refutation of
the assumption of uniformity across cultural backgrounds. They asked U.S.
women from different ethnic groups to rate themselves on a set of items assessing gender-stereotypic traits. Overall, the groups did not differ in their
ratings. Yet when the women were asked to interpret the response categories for the items, ethnic differences emerged for several items. The
researchers argued that effectively, women did not complete the "same"
questionnaire because the words and phrases carried different meanings
depending on a woman's ethnidcultural background. Calling for a revision
in methodology, they noted that "what we take to be the voice of data is the
voice of the researcher's interpretation of them" (p. 161).
Another methodological norm that postmodern psychologists have
criticized is categoricalism. By "categoricalism," I mean the practice of dividing people into categories (e.g., white/African American/Latino; hetero-
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sexual/lesbian/bisexual) and searching for the personal traits and attributes
that distinguish one group from the other. This has been a standard approach to producing knowledge in psychology, including feminist psychology. The following statements, for instance, are taken verbatim from a psychology of women textbook: "Lesbians had significantly higher self-esteem
than college women:'; "Black women reported a lower level of functioning
than Black men, White women, and White men." A moment's reflection on
these statements reveals how porous the boundaries of such categories are.
"Lesbians" and "college women" are hardly mutually exclusive categories.
Neither are black and Latina or white and Latina. Moreover, statements like
these take categories of race/ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and the like
as a priori givens. We might better see them as historically specific ideologies. Instead of regarding gender, class, race/ethnicity, and sexual orientation as ontological categories, we could investigate them as provisional
markers of identity and status. Another possibility would be to study class,
gender, and race as markers that set in motion relations of privilege, power,
subordination; and rebellion.
For postmodern psychology, any account of reality-including a scientific account-is a redescription. All accounts are organized within particular assumptive frameworks and embed certain interests. Alternate accounts
that represent social reality in other ways are always possible. Psychological'
constructs such as personality traits and psychiatric diagnoses are accounts
of reality that have certain features and that embed certain power relations.
For example, they redescribe social experiences as internal qualities. They
assume that those experiences (e.g., math anxiety, aggression, or depression) are similar for everyone and can be measured in the abstract, apart
from ongoing experience. In the clinical, domain, diagnostic classifications
have becom~ the dominant way of accounting for suffering. Diagnostic categories redescribe psychic distress in a particular way. For example, diagnostic categories redescribe psychic suffering as a discrete disorder, an "it."
They reduce distressing experience to a collection of symptoms lodged
within a person. Eliminating or reducing those symptoms becomes the goal
of treatment. This redescription is cloaked in the twin mantles of scientific
objectivity and benevolent medicine. Feminist critics have often asked
which diagnostic categories are good and which are bad, but they have paid
less attention to the consequences of the category system per se.
One alternative to diagnostic categories is to construe psychological
symptoms as idioms for expressing suffering. Such idioms are culturespecific, taking forms and conveying meanings that are intelligible to other
members of the culture. Thus, for example, "ants crawling in the head" is a
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common idiom of emotional distress in Nigeria, while cold hands is an
idiom of distress in Cambodia. Idioms of distress can also be thought of as
relational practices that accomplish certain interpersonal goals. Consider
recent reports of a dramatic rise in suicides among young women in the
People's Republic of China. Based on ethnographic work on recent deaths
and their knowledge of the cultural tradition of protest suicides, Lee and
Kleinman (2000) have interpreted these self-inflicted deaths as means of
registering protests against arranged marriages and other obstacles women
face when they try to improve their social status.

Studying Subjectivity
The questions that postmodern psychologists ask call for methods of investigation that go beyond canonical psychology research methods. Rather
than measuring people or categorizing them, postmodern psychologists
prefer to listen to them. Attending to people's own words brings us closer to
their psychological reality than having them check boxes or circlt numbers.
The goal of this listening is to retain the rich texture and multiple layers of
people's experience, not to reduce it to a set of unidimensional codes.
A number of feminist projects have developed sophisticated strategies
for analyzing unstructured talk. Some examples include The Male in the
Head (Holland, Ramazanoglu, Sharpe, & Thomson, 1998), Raising Their
Voices (Brown, 1998), Flirting with Danger (Phillips, 2000), and Young Masculinities (Frosh, Phoenix, &: Pattman, 2001). But the question of how to
interpret others' talk brings us face to face with a prior question: Who
should have authority over interpretation and meaning? This is an ethical
question as well as an epistemological one. An extreme position would restrict the researcher's task to bringing forward the voices of her participants
without any analysis or interpretation. In this view, any interpretation involves a kind of psychological imperialism: it appropriates participants'
words for researchers' purposes and imposes researchers' meanings on
them. Some feminists have experimented with ways of acknowledging different truths, negotiating the different positions of researcher and respondent, and representing conflicting interpretations. For instance, Glenda
Russell (2000) deliberately constructed an interpretive team with a disparate mix of members, so that multiple investments and multiple ways of
seeing would be in play during the process of dat,r analysis. Judith Stacey
(1990) requested the participants in her study of Silicon Valley families to
provide a gloss on her ethnography, granting them, as she put it, "the right
to control its closing words" (p. 273).
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Objectivity
The discipline of psychology has long held that adequate controls can prevent the social identity of researchers from influencing the research process.
But philosophers of social science (some influenced by postmodernism,
some not) have long challenged this notion of knowledge uninfluenced by
values and personal commitments. Researchers do not have what Donna
Haraway has called "the god's-eye-view" of the world: objective, disinterested, all-seeing. Our value commitments and social identities inevitably
influence choices we make regarding the topics we study, as well as our theoretical frameworks, research procedures, and interpretations of the data.
Value-free research is a myth akin to the myth of value-free psychotherapy.
Critics who challenged the notion of value-free therapy pointed out that
often therapy seems value-free because it upholds the values prevailing in
the culture. Fish do not recognize that they are swimming in water. A parallel claim might be made about research: research that appears to be objective or value-free might appear so only because the pretheoretical assumptions hovering·over it are those of the culture and thus remain unseen.

Rethinking Ethical Responsibilities
The research approaches that I have been describing demand that we rethink our ethical responsibilities and move beyond the Ethical Principles of
Psychologists. The ethical principles of research seem designed with the
prototypical psychology study in mind: an encounter that takes place in a
dearly demarcated time and place (e.g., a laboratory session) in which both
the experimenter's and the participant's everyday identities are bracketed.
Furthermore, the ethical code pertains in large measure to atomistic individuals who are regarded as generic "human subjects." What happens when
data collection is not so clearly delimited? For.example, field data may include casual remarks passed in everyday conversations or interchanges between strangers that are accidentally overheard. Moreover, the prescribed
procedures for assuring confidentiality and anonymity often are not sufficient when we work with respondents' own words and when our studies
are embedded in a particular place and time, rather than in the ahistorical
laboratory.
When we study individuals embedded in particular social groups or
contexts (neighborhoods, ethnic communities, cultures, or schools), the
ethical questions compound. The ethical code, however, deals primarily
with individual respondents: their privacy rights, their physical safety, and
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their psychological welfare. But what about those who are spoken about,
such as siblings, spouses, parents, and bosses? Do they have privacy rights?
Furthermore, should any protections be extended to the groups or communities that respondents represent? Are these collective entities entitled to
privacy, consent, or protection from harm (including harm to their reputations)? Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2001), returning to the site of her fieldwork on mental illness in rural Ireland after 25 years, found that her work,
a classic of anthropology, was regarded as slander and traitorous by the villagers: "You wrote a book to please yourself at our expense. You ran us
down, girl. You ran us down" (p. 311). Scheper-Hughes beat a midnight retreat out of the village under threat of physical harm.
Lisa Fontes (1998) has noted that the question "How can researchers
best understand, interpret, and present findings?" is a question with ethical
dimensions as well as scientific ones. Many critics (e.g., Crawford &:
Marecek, 1989) have noted that the person-centered interpretations that
psychologists typically put forward locate the origins of behavior in the individual. This places the onus of change on the individual; in some situations, it is only a short step away froni blaming the victim. Otlier critics,
like Michelle Fine (1992), remind us that the material and social privileges
that psychologists as members of the middle class have are not available to
working and poor people, especially if they are not white. We psychologists
are prone to underestimate the constraints that such individuals face and
thus we may wrongly see them as passive, self-defeating, unresourceful,
and so on. The possibilities for self-efficacy, empowerment, and self-actualization are sharply curtailed in circumstances of injustice, domination, and
oppression.

NEW BUSINESS: POSTMODERNISM,
POSTFEMINISM, AND THE BACKLASH

A significant and vocal backlash against feminism has emerged in popular
culture (Faludi, 1991). The term feminism has come to be disparaged, even
vilified, by the mass media. Legal gains such as affirmative action and
reproductive rights have eroded; state support for poor women and their
children has been severely curtailed by the welfare reforms of 1996. The
backlash against feminism is also palpable in psychology as a discipline and
a profession. Feminism and other progressive approaches to knowledge
have been nudged aside in favor of new approaches that are more politically
conservative. These include an emphasis on the biological bases of behav-
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for, the so-called positive psychology movement, and evolutionary psychology. Conservative pressures have mounted for the field of psychology to
assume a public. profile more agreeable to conservative political leaders, to
recruit individuals with right-wing values to the discipline, and to tone
down its social activism (Redding, 2001). Feminist clinicians are faced with
additional conservative pressures from managed care companies, drug
companies, and the biologically oriented psychiatric establishment. Together, they compose a broad-based movement that redefines psychological
difficulties as biological aberrations best controlled by medication. Feminist therapists are not necessarily opposed to medication. However, biomedical perspectives can squeeze out attention to social context. Relieving
symptoms with drugs does not address the more difficult process of making
necessary changes in one's life situation.
All feminists face the backlash to some degree. I have been engaged in
a project involving interviews with feminist therapists (Marecek, 1999a;
Marecek & Kra~etz, 1998). These practitioners spoke vehemently about
the antifeminist attitudes they encountered in their work; they had heard
feminists characterized as angry, man-hating, "ball-busting," abrasive, homewreckers. For some, the backlash altered what they could safely say to
clients and colleagues. We feminists outside clinical settings too find ourselves making adjustments in our speech and actions in order to survive in
surroundings that have become inhospitable.
Neither scientific evidence nor postmodern critique is likely to dismantle the backlash. Nonetheless, postmodernism offers some tools for understanding the ideology of the backlash. Critical discourse analysis, the
study of how language figures in social processes, is one such tool. Critical
discourse analysis aims to uncover the nonobvious ways in which language
operates in social relations of domination and power and in ideology
(Fairclough, 2001). One important function it can perform is to alert us to
the ways in which the terms and forms of the backlash enter into our own
language practices.
Let me return to the research on feminist therapists that I described
earlier to give an example (Marecek, 1999b). In one portion of the research
interview, respondents briefly narrated their development as feminist therapists. In many of the narratives, anger was a prominent element; redemption from anger was a recurrent theme. Many therapists described themselves as having been too angry when they were younger women or
inexperienced therapists; at the time of the interview, they remarked that
their anger had been tempered. 4 Here are some exa!Ilples from the interview transcripts:
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Th. 103: I think in the earlier years of my practice, I was--the anger
that I had with men and with patriarchy and with institutions that were
male-dominated would come through more.
Th. 53: Well, I think I'm pretty typical and part of it is age. And wisdom, which comes with age, which is nice. Because you don't have to be
so angry.
Th. 225: I'd say 10 or 15 years ago, I was very outspoken. I would
probably say anything I wanted to say anywhere to anybody. I was probably very angry with myself and you feel depressed. What I've done now is
I have more understanding.
Th. 150: When I was younger, I was more strident [in therapy]. The
factors that have affected that are experience, living in the world longer.
[Int.: What specifically made that change? I I wasn't having the same level
of overflow of my own issues into my work. I matured in the heart sense.
These accounts place anger in opposition to maturity, wisdom, reason,
and understanding. Like the backlash's characterizations of feminists as
abrasive and ball-busting, the accounts leave little room for the p9ssibility
that a feminist's anger might be legitimate or reasonable. Accounting for anger as a developmental stage of immaturity (akin perhaps to adolescent rebellion) serves to discredit it. Such accounts deflect attention from the legitimate reasons women might have for being angry. We cannot, of course,
demonstrate a direct connection between the backlash ideology and the
presence of these themes in feminists' narratives of their own personal development. However, the language and meanings circulating in the culture
furnish the material available for crafting personal accounts and personal
identities. We feminists may resist and reshape the meanings that the cultural backlash has given to feminism, but we cannot lift ourselves out from
the culture.

CONCLUSION
It would be rash to predict what twists and turns lie ahead for feminism,
postmodernism, psychology, and possible combinations of them. Nor can I
predict what twists and turns lie in the future for the strained relation between mainstream culture and feminism. Yet there are a few predictions
that are safe to make. What lies ahead will not be a return to the past. Certain claims of postmodernism have transformed intellectual inquiry in most
humanities and social science disciplines throughout much of the world.
The discipline of psychology in the United States is one of the few sites to
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remain largely ignorant of these transformations (see the essays collected
by Marecek, in press). The claims of postmodernism seem unlikely to disappear in a swing back to brute realism. Three such claims seem central:
that there can be no prediscursive knowledge that is free from the values
and assumptions of its social setting; that knowledge is always situated and
any knower has access only to partial truth; and that a researchers social
identity inevitably shapes the research process. Feminism too has had a
transformative effect on most academic disciplines, though its effect on academic psychology in the United States has been muted. Feminist psychologists have argued that social life is gendered in profound ways, as is intellectual life. They have exposed gender-linked power relations, calling
attention to experiences of violence, intimidation, and abuse of power in
intimate relations and domestic life. Feminists have set off storms of controversy and embarked on novel forms of social action. Whatever new possibilities feminist psychologists invent to theorize gender, personality, and
psychopathology, we must continue our tradition of disrupting the takenfor-granted, speaking truth to power, and taking leaps into the unknown.

NOTES
1. Note how closely Erikson's line of thought parallels that of Jean Baker Miller in
Toward a New Psychology of Women (1976). Feminists of the s~ties vilified
Erikson, while Baker Miller's version of women's difference became a touchstone
for many feminists of the eighties.
2. Empiricism originally referred to the practice of medicine based purely on observation; two synonyms are "quackery" and "charlatanism."
3. For example, a review of a book on women and madness was titled "Now That
We're Angry, We're No Longer Mad."
4. Neither a therapist's actual age or the length of time she had been doing therapy
was related to her use of this developmental narrative.
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